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1 Introduction
Within economics, the patent system is traditionally framed as a device to stimulate innovation.
This “reward theory” view of the patent system maintains that patents grant temporary monopoly
power to successful innovators in order to foster the ex ante private incentive to invest in R&D.
In the judicial system however, patents are instead often conceptualized primarily as a means to
disseminate technical information into the public domain. Section 112 of US patent law states that
patents “must contain a written description ... as to enable any person skilled in the art ... to make
and use the same.” Under this “contract theory” view of patents, temporary monopoly is offered
to innovators ex post in exchange for disclosing information that would otherwise remain secret
indefinitely. The primacy of this reasoning within the court system is exemplified by a unanimous
decision of the United States Supreme Court issued in 1989, which stated that “the ultimate goal
of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through
disclosure.”1
There is a clear tension between these “twin purposes” of the patent system. After all, firms
choose to patent innovations only when doing so increases profitability relative to keeping them se-
cret. As noted by Kultti et al. (2007), “if patenting enhances the incentive to innovate by improving
appropriability, how can it simultaneously spread information and thereby the possibilities to imi-
tate the patented innovation?” To the extent that disclosed information can be used by competitors
to imitate innovations in ways that either do not explicitly infringe on a patent, or that are difficult
for the patent owner to prevent, disclosure requirements can undermine the reward function of the
patent system. Indeed, firms do routinely decide not to patent eligible innovations. Evidence from
surveys of European and US firms estimate patent propensity, defined as the proportion of innova-
tions for which a patent application is made, to be between 30-55% (Cohen et al., 2002; Hall et al.,
2014). Across a wide range of industries, firms report secrecy to be a more effective appropriation
mechanism than patents, and disclosure requirements are cited as a key reason firms choose not to
patent (Arundel, 2001; Cohen et al., 2000, 2002; Hall et al., 2013).
On the other hand, if secrecy truly offers superior appropriability, one may wonder why firms
ever choose to patent. In some cases, the answer may simply be that firms obtain a patent when it
is difficult to keep the underlying innovation secret. If, for example, a particular innovation can be
easily reverse engineered, technical information quickly leaks to competitors regardless of whether
a patent is obtained.2 Alternatively, Anton and Yao (2004) and Zaby (2010) argue that the relative
value of obtaining a patent depends on the size of the competitive advantage that the innovation
provides. Patents may effectively deter imitation of less substantial innovations because the costs to
competitors associated with the risk of patent infringement outweigh the benefits of catching up to
the innovator through imitation. However, the larger the lead of an innovator over its competitors,
1Decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). See Roin (2005) for an
extensive discussion on the emphasis placed on the contract theory of patents in the courts.
2This view is summarized in Boldrin and Levine (2013), “ideas will be patented when it seems likely that the
secret would have emerged before the patent expired and not patented if the secret can be kept.”
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the greater the incentive for competitors to attempt imitation, and the greater the effective cost of
disclosing technical information through a patent. In fact, this type of selection into patenting has
been a long standing critique of the contract theory, for it implies that the information disclosed
through patents is concentrated among a subset of innovations that are either relatively minor or
would have entered the public domain even in the absence of a patent system.3
However, patents do offer a distinct advantage over secrecy by granting a degree of forward
protection against competing innovation. That is, the effective breadth of patent protection in-
creasingly includes the use of the original idea in future applications (Merges and Nelson, 1990;
Jaffe, 2000; Gallini, 2002). Survey evidence shows that firms often choose to patent specifically in
order to leverage a “blocking” effect on competitor innovation despite viewing secrecy as a superior
option to protect against imitation.4 Through the lens of the contract theory, this suggests a social
benefit of forward protection since it encourages more innovators to bear the costs associated with
a patent’s information disclosure requirements. In terms of the reward theory however, there is
growing concern that forward protection engenders rent seeking behavior that ultimately stifles
innovation. In particular, since modern innovation necessitates building on many existing compo-
nents and ideas, there is “a very real danger that a single product or service will infringe on many
patents ... imposing an unnecessary drag on innovation by enabling multiple rights owners to ‘tax’
new products” (Shapiro, 2001). Commenting on the implications of this “patent thicket” effect,
Boldrin and Levine (2013) argue that “the main dynamic general equilibrium effect of a patent
system is to subject future inventions to a gigantic hold-up problem: with many licenses to be
purchased and uncertainty about the ultimate value of the new innovation, each patent holder, in
raising the price of his ‘component,’ imposes an externality on other patent holders.”5
In this paper, I develop a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth to evaluate these
aspects of patent policy in terms of both the reward and contract theory. In so doing, I attempt
to merge two distinct lines of literature: the patent design literature that models firm choice of
patents versus secrecy in a partial equilibrium setting (Denicolò and Franzoni, 2003; Anton and
Yao, 2004; Kultti et al., 2007; Zaby, 2010; Kwon, 2012) and the endogenous growth literature
that analyzes patent policy in terms of its general equilibrium effect on innovation (O’donoghue
and Zweimüller, 2004; Chu, 2009; Chu et al., 2012; Acemoglu and Akcigit, 2012; Denicolò and
Zanchettin, 2012; Cozzi and Galli, 2014; Yang, 2018). To my knowledge, only Suzuki (2015) and
Klein (2020) have incorporated endogenous patenting and secrecy decisions in the context of general
equilibrium growth. In both cases, these authors analyze how this decision impacts the reward effect
of patent protection under the assumption that all innovators are homogenous and choose the same
3As noted in Denicolò and Franzoni (2003), this critique dates back at least as far as Rogers (1863); “what kind
of contract is this, where the innovator keeps the best innovations for himself and gives the worse ... to the state?”
4For example, of the over 1,000 U.S. manufacturing firms surveyed in Cohen et al. (2000), 81.8% of firms include
the blocking function of patents among the reasons that they ultimately chose to apply for a patent. In the same
survey, 51% of firms consider secrecy as an effective appropriation mechanism for product innovations compared
to 34.8% for patents. For process innovations, 50.6% view secrecy as effective against just 23.3% for patents. See
Arundel (2001) and Hall et al. (2014) for additional evidence.
5See Akcigit and Ates (2019) for a recent discussion highlighting the role of this strategic use of patenting in
declining business dynamism in the US.
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mixture of patents and secrecy to protect their innovations. These analyses make an important
contribution to the endogenous growth literature by demonstrating that stronger patent protection
can fail to stimulate economic growth when innovators have the option to rely on secrecy. However,
by construction, they do not consider why some firms choose secrecy while others patent, nor the
consequences associated with this selection for the degree of overlapping rights creating patent
thickets and the type of information disclosed through patents.
In contrast, I explicitly incorporate these considerations into a Schumpeterian quality ladder
framework of endogenous cumulative innovation. Following Minniti et al. (2013) and Chu et al.
(2017, 2019), the step size of each innovation’s quality improvement is randomly drawn from a
stationary Pareto distribution. After receiving their draw, each new industry leader chooses ei-
ther to patent its innovation or keep it secret. Patents offer innovators a degree protection in
two dimensions: backward protection against potential imitators and forward protection against
subsequent innovation that displaces their leadership position. In the spirit of Kultti et al. (2007),
Kwon (2012), and Klein (2020), backward protection is modeled as a probabilistic right to exclude
competitors from the use of the information disclosed within the patent. Following O’donoghue
and Zweimüller (2004) and Chu (2009), forward protection takes the form of a profit-sharing rule
between current and former inventors through mandatory licensing agreements. Although secrecy
does not provide forward protection, it provides superior backward protection since firms avoid
information disclosure and prevent imitation as long as technical information does not “leak” to
competitors. To capture the presence of patent thickets, I assume that each new innovation builds
on a subset of current innovations across industries. Each new innovator must pay a licensing fee
to each of the owners of these current innovations, if they hold a patent. This implies that the
total licensing burden of new innovators depends on the endogenous patent propensity of firms
throughout the economy.
I demonstrate that heterogeneity in industry leaders’ quality advantage over competitors de-
livers an endogenous selection into patents versus secrecy that mirrors the findings of the partial
equilibrium analyses of Anton and Yao (2004) and Zaby (2010). Firms with relatively small inno-
vations choose to patent because their expected licensing revenue offsets the expected reduction in
profits from the sale of their own innovation implied by patent disclosure. Firms with relatively
large innovations choose secrecy in order to better preserve their large profit flow over their tenure
as industry leader. I show that general equilibrium considerations have important implications for
this equilibrium partition. Specifically, the greater the economy’s rate of innovation, the shorter
the expected period that firms remain industry leader, implying a greater incentive to patent to
secure licensing revenue.
Within this general equilibrium framework, changes to patent policy gives rise to novel, compet-
ing effects on both economic growth and welfare. First, increasing backward protection strengthens
the monopoly position of patented innovations by decreasing the ability of competitors to utilize
disclosed information. This implies a standard reward theory trade-off; increased appropriability
enhances R&D incentives but reduces the welfare benefit of each innovation by limiting competi-
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tion. However, the direction of these effects can be reversed when one accounts for the endogenous
patenting decision of innovators. Specifically, the increased appropriability of patents relative to
secrecy generates an increase in equilibrium patent propensity. This increases the expected licens-
ing burden of each innovator and reduces ex ante R&D incentives. I show that the net change to
economic growth can be positive or negative, and depends on the relative size of this patent thicket
effect and the traditional reward effect. In addition, the shift into patenting implies an increase in
the proportion of innovations for which technical information is disclosed. This creates a welfare
trade-off specific to the contract theory of patents; the net effect depends on the relative size of the
increase in the volume of disclosed information against the increased limitations on its use.
Although strengthening forward protection also increases the relative attractiveness of patents
over secrecy, I show that the corresponding increase in innovator’s expected licensing burden always
decreases R&D incentives and economic growth. This finding agrees with existing analyses of for-
ward protection in endogenous growth models that assume all innovations are protected by patents,
such as O’donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) and Yang (2018). Nevertheless, by incorporating the
option to keep innovations secret, the model still highlights a novel welfare trade-off specific to the
contract theory of patents. The shift into patenting caused by strengthened forward protection
unambiguously increases the volume of information disclosure in the economy. The overall wel-
fare impact of the policy change is determined by the relative importance of this pro-competitive
increase in disclosure against the reduction in the rate of economic growth.
To better understand the relative magnitude of these competing effects, I calibrate the model to
basic long-run features of the US economy and analyze the impact of patent policy numerically. The
benchmark simulations show that strengthening forward or backward patent protection ultimately
decreases private R&D incentives and economic growth. That is, I find that the positive reward
effect of greater appropriability is dominated by the patent thicket effect created by the increased
licensing burden of each new innovator as more innovators select into patenting. Indeed, this finding
appears surprisingly general, and holds across most plausible cases.6 I find that stronger backward
protection increases economic growth only when the economy’s patent propensity is quite high
(close to 100%), or the distribution of innovation size is skewed heavily towards minor innovations.
Second, I find that the overall welfare impact of patent policy is dictated by its effect on economic
growth in most cases. In other words, although the information disclosure function of the patent
system generates a positive welfare effect as emphasized by the contract theory of patents, it is
usually dominated by reward theory considerations. In particular, I find that the contract theory of
patents provides an independent justification for strengthening patent protection only when R&D
investment exhibits severe diminishing marginal returns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the theoretical model.
Section 3 examines patent policy analytically in the context of the reward and contract theory of
patents. Numerical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
6This prediction of the model is supported by empirical evidence that the continued strengthening of the legal
protection afforded to patent holders has failed to stimulate innovation, the so called “patent puzzle.” See Klein
(2020) for further discussion of this result in the context of endogenous growth models.
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2 The Model
2.1 Patents Versus Secrecy
The economy consists of a unit continuum of structurally identical industries indexed by ω ∈
[0, 1]. In each industry ω and time t, there exists a single leading firm that has successfully
innovated the industry’s current state-of-the-art product. A unit mass of competitive R&D firms,
or “followers,” participate in R&D races to innovate the next quality improvement and supplant
the current leader. The winner of the R&D race for the jth quality vintage of industry ω’s product
at time t discovers an innovation that represents a λ(j, ω, t) size quality improvement over the
previous vintage. That is,
λ(j, ω, t) ≡
q(j, ω, t)
q(j − 1, ω, t)
> 1, (2.1)
where q(j, ω, t) denotes the product quality associated with the specified vintage, industry, and
time. Following Minniti et al. (2013) and Chu et al. (2017, 2019), the winner of each R&D race






where κ ∈ (0, 1) determines the distribution’s shape parameter, 1/κ.7
As in the standard quality ladder framework, leaders and followers within industries compete in
prices. Each new leader optimally exploits its innovation’s quality advantage through limit pricing
and captures its industry’s entire market share. This implies that each λ(j, ω, t) quality advan-
tage draw can be immediately translated into corresponding monopoly flow profits, π(λ(j, ω, t), t).
However, leaders face two threats to their dominant market position: subsequent innovation and
imitation by industry followers. Successful imitation of a leader’s product enables a follower to
copy the industry’s state-of-the-art quality. That is, imitation implies full catch-up and eliminates
the leader’s quality advantage regardless of its initial size. As detailed further in Section 2.3, once
a leader’s product has been imitated, price competition drives the market price to marginal cost
and the leader’s flow profits to zero.
To protect their monopoly position, each new quality leader chooses either to patent their
innovation or keep it secret as soon as its quality draw is realized. Both appropriation methods
are imperfect. When a leader chooses to patent, there exists a probability mp ∈ (0, 1) that a
leader’s patent will not effectively prevent follower imitation. As in Kultti et al. (2007) and Kwon
(2012), this single probability of imitation is intended to distill all relevant aspects of the imperfect
backward protection provided by patents. In particular, I interpret mp to represent the aggregate
threat of imitation due to information disclosure requirements and the ability of followers to utilize
this disclosed information given limited patent length, breadth, and enforcement. I treat mp as an
exogenous policy parameter, wheremp = 0 represents perfect backward protection from patents and
7See Minniti et al. (2013) for evidence that the empirical distribution of innovation size is well approximated by
a Pareto distribution.
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mp = 1 represents nonexistent backward protection. Although secrecy avoids formal information
disclosure, followers are free to imitate the latest quality vintage if they can uncover its underlying
technical information. This information leakage occurs with probability ms ∈ (0, 1).
Throughout the main analysis, I assume that mp > ms so that secrecy provides superior pro-
tection from imitation in accordance with firm survey evidence. As we will see, this assumption
will underpin the positive welfare effect of the information disclosure requirements of patents that
are central to the contract theory of patents. In effect, mp > ms ensures that more technical
information enters into the public domain when a leader chooses to patent. Simplifying notation,
the expected profit flows of a λ size quality leader in a typical industry under patent and secrecy
respectively are
πp(λ, t) = (1−mp)π(λ, t), πs(λ, t) = (1−ms)π(λ, t). (2.3)
Unlike secrecy however, patents offer a degree of forward protection. As in O’donoghue and
Zweimüller (2004) and Chu (2009), forward protection takes the form of compulsory licensing agree-
ments between the patent holder and subsequent innovators that build on the patented innovation.
This existing literature assumes that this cumulative nature of quality improvement is restricted to
new innovations within the same industry. That is, new quality vintages infringe only on patents
covering previous iterations of the same product. In contrast, I assume that each new innovation
builds on some potentially patent protected component of the current state-of-the-art product in a
φ ∈ (0, 1) proportion of industries in the economy. New innovators must obtain a license from each
associated industry leader, if that incumbent leader holds a patent. I treat φ as an exogenous policy
parameter that represents the breadth of forward patent protection.8 To maintain a symmetric
equilibrium structure with a common rate of innovation in each industry, I(ω, t) = I(t), I assume
that this forward protection breadth is common across industries. In this way, each successive
quality vintage shares the same potential to infringe on multiple patents and each patent has the
same potential to secure licensing agreements with multiple future innovators.9
In the spirit of O’donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) and Chu (2009), the licensing payment to
the owner of each patented component is determined based on the expected value of a flow payment
of s ∈ (0, 1) share of the new innovator’s monopoly profits π(λ, t) over its tenure as industry leader.
To keep the analysis tractable, I assume that innovators pay the present discounted value of the
requisite licensing fee to all infringed patent holders as a lump sum as soon as innovation occurs.
As we will see, this implies that the expected licensing revenue from owning a patent does not
8Empirical analyses of patent citations provide direct empirical support for the presence of such inter-industry
patent overlap. Fung (2005) and Blazsek and Escribano (2010) document that newly granted patents routinely
include citations of existing patents across different industries, and such inter-industry citations often comprise the
majority of a patent’s total citations. In addition, Niwa (2016, 2018) analyze licensing agreements across industries
in the context of horizontal innovation in a variety expansion model of growth. In this work, each new variety is
assumed to infringe on the patents of all existing incumbents. In the present model, I assume that the degree of such
inter-industry patent overlap is determined by patent law.
9O’donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) and Chu (2009) do allow for new innovations to infringe on multiple patents
covering several previous vintages of the industry’s product. Instead, I follow Chu et al. (2012) and Yang (2018)
and assume that infringement occurs only on the most recent vintage. However, since I extend this framework to
incorporate infringement across industries, numerous innovations may still infringe on a single patent.
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depend on the probability of imitation corresponding to the licensee’s choice of patenting versus
secrecy. Consequently, it ensures that the value of forward protection provided by patents depends
only on its breadth φ and the size of each licensing deal determined by the policy parameter s, but
is independent of the degree of backward protection mp.
10
Let vL(λ, t) denote the value of the lump sum licensing payment from a λ size quality leader to
a single infringed patent holder. vL(λ, t) is calculated through a standard no-arbitrage condition
that equates the expected return of the licensing deal over the licensee’s duration as industry leader
to the risk-free market rate r(t). Over an interval of time dt, the licensee owes a sπ(λ, t)dt share
of profits to the patent holder. With probability I(t)dt, the licensee is replaced as industry leader,
terminating the agreement. If the licensee is not replaced, the value of the agreement changes by
v̇L(λ, t)dt. The corresponding no-arbitrage condition is
r(t)vL(λ, t)dt = sπ(λ, t)dt− I(t)vL(λ, t)dt+ (1− I(t)dt)v̇L(λ, t)dt. (2.4)
Taking limits as dt → 0 and collecting terms, we have
vL(λ, t) =
sπ(λ, t)
r(t) + I(t)− v̇L(λ,t)vL(λ,t)
. (2.5)
The total licensing obligation of each new innovator depends on the patenting decision of indus-
try leaders throughout the economy. Using the law of large numbers, the total expected licensing




1p(ω, t)vL(λ, t)dω = φnp(t)vL(λ, t), (2.6)
where forward protection breadth φ determines the proportion of industries for which a new inno-
vation potentially infringes on existing patents, 1p(ω, t) is an indicator function taking the value
of one if the leader in industry ω owns a patent at time t, and np(t) denotes the economy wide
proportion of leaders that own a patent at time t.
Let vp(λ, t) and vs(λ, t) denote the expected value of a λ size innovation under patent or secrecy
respectively, after paying the requisite upfront licensing fees of expected size VL(λ, t). When a
leader chooses to patent, they earn an expected profit flow πp(λ, t)dt over an interval of time dt.
Innovation occurs in each industry ω with probability I(ω, t)dt, and each such innovation has a
probability φ of resulting in a licensing deal for a patent holder. The expected number of licensing




φI(ω, t)dtdω = φI(t)dt, (2.7)
in a symmetric equilibrium with I(ω, t) = I(t). Each licensing deal results in an immediate payment
10Modeling licensing payments as a lump sum is also consistent with the fact that licensing fees are typically
negotiated when the ultimate value of a new innovation remains uncertain (Boldrin and Levine, 2013).
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that depends on the infringing party’s λ draw according to (2.5), with expected size Eλ[vL(λ, t)].
There is a capital loss vp(λ, t) from replacement when the next innovation occurs in the patent
holder’s industry, with probability I(t)dt, and a change in valuation v̇p(t)dt if the firm remains the
leader with probability (1− I(t)dt). Equating this overall expected return to the interest rate r(t),
taking limits as dt → 0 and collecting terms, we have
vp(λ, t) =





When a leader chooses secrecy, they forgo potential licensing revenue in exchange for a larger
expected profit flow. The corresponding no-arbitrage condition is
vs(λ, t) =
(1−ms)π(λ, t)
r(t) + I(t)− v̇s(λ,t)vs(λ,t)
. (2.9)
Since each innovator chooses either secrecy or a patent in order to maximize the expected
present discounted value of their innovation, the total expected value of an innovation of size λ is
given by
V (λ, t) = max{vp(λ, t), vs(λ, t)} − VL(λ, t). (2.10)
2.2 Households
As in the traditional quality ladder framework, the economy is populated by a unit continuum
of identical households. Each household is a dynastic family of infinitely lived members that begins
with a single member at t = 0 and grows at the common rate n > 0. The population of the economy














q(j, ω, t)y(j, ω, t)
]
dω, (2.12)
where q(j, ω, t) denotes the quality of the jth vintage of industry ω’s product at time t and y(j, ω, t)
denotes the associated quantity consumed.
Households maximize (2.11) by allocating per capita consumption expenditure c(t) given prices
at time t. Since quality adjusted products within each industry are perfect substitutes, households
purchase only the product with the lowest quality adjusted price. Products enter utility symmet-
rically, so households optimally spread expenditure evenly across each industry. Demand for the
8





where p(ω, t) is the market price of the associated good. Given (2.13), maximizing (2.11) subject
to the standard intertemporal budget yields
ċ(t)
c(t)
= r(t)− ρ, (2.14)
where r(t) is the instantaneous market interest rate.
2.3 Production and R&D
In each industry, labor is used for R&D and the manufacture of final goods. Labor is the only
factor of production and one unit of labor is required to produce one unit of output, regardless of
the product’s quality. All firms share a common marginal cost equal to the wage rate, which is
normalized to unity and serves as the numéraire. In each industry, firms compete in prices under two
possible cases depending on whether successful imitation of the industry’s state-of-the-art product
has occurred. While an industry leader maintains its quality advantage, it optimally charges a limit
price of p(ω, t) = λ(ω, t). Given equal costs of production, this limit price ensures that followers
can do no better than break even and exit the market. Using (2.13), the instantaneous flow profits
associated with a λ(ω, t) quality lead are




where λ(ω, t) − 1 is the profit margin and c(t)N(t)/λ(ω, t) is total quantity sold. If the leader’s
product is imitated, competition drives the market price to marginal cost and flow profits to zero.
Since this implies that both the leader and imitating follower exactly break even, I assume that
the leader continues to serve the entire market, with total quantity sold at the competitive level
of c(t)N(t). Thus, leaders remain active in the market until they are displaced by subsequent
innovation.
Followers in each industry participate in R&D races to innovate the next quality vintage and
supplant the current leader. A follower i that employs lR,i(ω, t) units of labor in R&D at time t










where 0 < β < 1 and LR(ω, t) =
∑
i lR,i(ω, t) is the total R&D labor used by firms in industry
ω. Equation (2.16) combines two common features of R&D technology specifications in endoge-
nous growth models. Following the approach pioneered by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) and
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Dinopoulos and Thompson (2000), the first term in (2.16) implies that R&D difficulty is propor-
tional to the size of the economy’s population. This eliminates the counterfactual scale effects
present in first-generation endogenous growth models, while maintaining a tractable analytical
structure. The second term in (2.16) implies that each firm’s instantaneous probability of success-
ful innovation is a decreasing function of total R&D investment in the industry. This captures the
well-established presence of duplicative R&D investment among firms competing in R&D races,
and imposes decreasing returns to R&D at the industry level.11 The industry wide innovation rate








Each follower chooses lR,i(ω, t) in order to maximize its expected discounted profits. Free-
entry into R&D implies that in every industry with positive research expenditure, the expected
return to R&D must exactly offset its cost. Let Eλ[V (λ, t)] denote the ex ante expected value of a
successful innovation, taking into account the innovator’s optimal choice of patenting versus secrecy
and expected licensing burden as in (2.10). In a symmetric equilibrium with I(ω, t) = I(t) >
0, free-entry implies that followers in each industry choose R&D employment so that lR,i(t) =
ii(t)Eλ[V (λ, t)]. Using (2.16) and (2.17), the free-entry condition can be written as
Eλ[V (λ, t)] = α̂N(t)I(t)
β
1−β , (2.18)
where α̂ = α1/1−β .
2.4 Equilibrium
I now solve the model for a steady state equilibrium in which I(ω, t) = I(t), np(t), and c(t) are
constant, the labor market clears, the free-entry condition (2.18) holds, and each leader chooses
either secrecy or a patent to maximize their value. It follows immediately from (2.5), (2.8), (2.9),
(2.15), and (2.18) that the value of each innovation, whether patented or secret, grows at the rate
of population growth n in equilibrium. That is, v̇p(λ, t)/vp(λ, t) = v̇s(λ, t)/vs(λ, t) = n. This is
the standard implication of endogenous growth specifications in which R&D difficulty grows at
rate n, as in (2.17). From the Euler equation (2.14), constant per capita consumption expenditure
implies that r(t) = ρ. In the main text, I restrict attention to the case where neither appropriation
method strictly dominates the other, so that both secrecy and patents are chosen by some firms in
equilibrium and 0 < np(t) < 1. Henceforth, I drop the time index for all variables that are constant
in equilibrium.
11See Jones and Williams (2000) for a discussion of the importance of this R&D duplication or “stepping on toes
effect” in endogenous growth models. Additional examples of this approach to decreasing returns to R&D at the
industry level include Impullitti (2010), Chu et al. (2012), and Cozzi and Galli (2014).
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2.4.1 Patents versus secrecy in equilibrium
Let Vp(λ, t) and Vs(λ, t) denote the total expected value of an innovation of size λ under patent
and secrecy respectively, including licensing payments. That is, Vp(λ, t) = vp(λ, t) − VL(λ, t) and
Vs(λ, t) = vs(λ, t)− VL(λ, t). Using (2.5), (2.8), and (2.9), we have
Vs(λ, t) =








(ρ− n+ I)(ρ− n+ I)
(2.20)
As in Chu (2009) and Yang (2018), each innovator’s licensing obligation acts as a reduction in
their expected flow profits over their tenure as industry leader. In the present model however, this
licensing obligation depends on the endogenous proportion of firms that choose to patent, np. In
addition, observe that the impact of forward patent protection on both the licensing obligation of all
new innovators and the expected licensing revenue of patent holders is determined by the product
of forward protection breadth and licensing magnitude, φs ∈ (0, 1). Without loss of generality, I
henceforth treat φs as a single parameter that determines the overall strength of forward patent
protection. In order to ensure that new innovators always enter the market after receiving their λ
draw, I impose the following parameter restriction
Assumption 1. φs < 1−ms.
Under Assumption 1, each firm’s licensing obligation is sufficiently small relative to its expected
flow profits as industry leader so that V (λ, t) = max{Vp(λ, t), Vs(λ, t)} > 0 for all λ > 1.
Although all firms that choose to patent share a common expected licensing revenue, the effective
cost of patenting depends on the innovator’s flow profits. This implies that an innovator’s optimal
choice of a patent versus secrecy depends on the size of its innovation. More formally, an innovator
will choose to patent if and only if Vs(λ, t) ≤ Vp(λ, t). Using (2.19) and (2.20), this condition can
be rewritten




The left hand side of (2.21) captures the cost of patenting in terms of reduced expected profit
flows due to information disclosure and is strictly increasing in λ. The right hand side captures the
benefit in terms of expected licensing revenue, which is constant in the innovator’s λ. Therefore,
we can characterize the patent, secrecy decision of all firms in the economy in terms of a threshold
innovation size λ̃. When both patenting and secrecy occur in equilibrium, λ̃ is determined by the






Where 0 < Ω ≡ κ/(1 + κ) < 1 denotes the portion of expected profit that depends on the draw of
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Rearranging gives the following equilibrium condition,
λ̃ =
(ρ− n+ I)(mp −ms)
(ρ− n+ I)(mp −ms)− φsIΩ
, (2.24)
where all firms that receive an innovation draw of λ ≤ λ̃ choose to patent and all firms that receive
λ > λ̃ choose secrecy. Therefore, as in the partial equilibrium analyses of Anton and Yao (2004)
and Zaby (2010), the model delivers an equilibrium partition into patenting and secrecy in which
firms with relatively small innovations choose to patent, while firms with relatively large innovations
choose secrecy. Using the law of large numbers, we can express the economy wide proportion of
innovations under patent in terms of the probability of receiving a λ ≤ λ̃ draw. That is,
np(λ̃) = F (λ̃) = 1− λ̃
−1/κ (2.25)
When convenient, I refer to np(λ̃) as the economy wide “patent propensity” and to λ̃ as the
equilibrium “patent threshold.” Note that patent propensity is uniquely determined by and strictly
increasing in the patent threshold.
In a steady state equilibrium with constant I, λ̃ and np are both constant. However, the
equilibrium value of λ̃ is strictly increasing in the equilibrium I. This is because a greater rate of
innovation makes the forward protection from subsequent innovations offered by patents relatively
more attractive. Indeed, as I → 0, the benefit of patenting disappears, and λ̃ → 1 implying all
firms choose secrecy. As I → ∞,
λ̃ → λ̃max ≡
mp −ms
mp −ms − φsΩ
. (2.26)
To ensure that the patent threshold is well defined for any positive, finite rate of innovation, I
impose the following parameter restriction
Assumption 2. φsΩ < mp −ms.
Under Assumption 2, the effective cost of patenting is sufficiently high such that some firms always
prefer secrecy in equilibrium and 0 < np < 1. Finally, note that it is immediate from (2.24) that
the patent threshold decreases in mp and increases φs. That is, stronger backward or forward
patent protection increases the attractiveness of patenting relative to secrecy, increasing the patent
threshold and patent propensity. Summarizing, we have,
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium choice of patenting versus secrecy of all
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innovators in the economy is completely characterized by a unique patent threshold 1 < λ̃ < ∞. All
innovations of size λ ≤ λ̃ are protected by patent and all innovations of size λ > λ̃ are protected
by secrecy. All else equal, the economy’s patent threshold and corresponding patent propensity are
strictly increasing in backward patent protection, forward patent protection, and the equilibrium rate
of innovation.
2.4.2 Labor market clearing and free-entry
Labor market clearing requires that the total labor employed in production and R&D equals
the economy’s population. Rearranging (2.17), total labor employed in R&D can be written in




Labor employed in manufacturing within each industry depends on the price with in that industry
ly(ω, t) = c(t)N(t)/p(ω, t). Prices are either equal to p(ω, t) = λ(ω, t) if the latest innovation has
not been imitated or p(ω, t) = 1 if it has. Using the equilibrium selection into patenting and secrecy

























As shown in the Appendix,
Ly(t) = cN(t)M(λ̃),










captures the mean labor requirement per unit of consumption expenditure as a function of the
patent threshold. Note that M(λ̃) > 0 and is strictly increasing in λ̃. This is an immediate
consequence of the disclosure requirements of patenting delivering mp > ms. Greater patent
propensity implies a greater proportion of industries produce under competitive conditions where
each unit of consumption expenditure corresponds to a greater quantity of output.
Using (2.27) and (2.29), the labor market clearing condition of N(t) = Ly(t) + LR(t) becomes,
1 = cM(λ̃) + α̂I
1
1−β . (2.30)
Thus, the usual resource allocation trade-off between consumption expenditure and innovation is
present in the model. An increase in the economy’s patent propensity effectively tightens the
resource constraint since it increases the manufacturing labor required to maintain a constant level
of per capita consumption expenditure.
The free-entry condition, equation (2.18), equates the expected value of developing an innovation
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to the associated R&D cost. Under the equilibrium selection into patenting and secrecy given by
the patent threshold in equation (2.24), we can write the ex ante expected value of an innovation
as









As shown in the Appendix, performing the required integration yields












As usual, the ex ante expected value of an innovation depends on the stream of profits extracted
from consumption expenditure in the industry discounted at an effective rate that includes the
threat of replacement, ρ− n+ I. The first term in brackets captures the contribution of expected
licensing revenue. Since only innovators that choose to patent receive licensing revenue, this term is
weighted by the probability of receiving a draw associated with patenting, F (λ̃) = np. The second
term captures expected licensing payments. All firms pay the same proportion of profits in licensing
fees and the magnitude of these fees depends on economy wide patent propensity. Together, these
two terms capture the traditional effect of blocking patents in endogenous growth models such as
O’donoghue and Zweimüller (2004), Chu (2009), and Yang (2018). Although ex ante expected
licensing payments equal expected licensing revenue, innovators discount future licensing revenue
relative to their immediate required payments. Consequently, the expected reward from innovation
decreases in forward patent protection.
The final term captures expected profit flows, net of licensing payments. Note that if all firms
chose to patent with λ̃ = ∞, then np = 1 and this net expected profit flow becomes Ω(1 − mp).
If all firms chose secrecy with λ̃ = 1, then np = 0 and the entire term in brackets collapses to a
net expected profit flow of Ω(1 − ms) since no licensing occurs. Furthermore, for any λ̃ > 1, we
have that Eλ[V (λ, t)] is strictly decreasing in mp. That is, as long as some firms choose to patent,
stronger backward protection from patents increases the expected value of an innovation. This
reflects the traditional reward theory motivation for strengthening patent protection.
Finally, note that the expected value of an innovation is decreasing in the economy’s patent
threshold λ̃ for two reasons. First, a greater patent threshold implies that innovators are more
likely to receive an innovation draw associated with patenting. This corresponds to lower expected
profit flows. Second, due to the presence of overlapping innovations across industries, the increase
in the economy wide patent propensity increases the volume of licensing payments between new
and incumbent innovators. That is, in terms of the ex ante value of an innovation, an increase in λ̃
behaves as an increase in the forward protection of patents. Summarizing, we have the following,
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the reward for successful innovation is strictly increasing
in backward patent protection, strictly decreasing in forward patent protection, and strictly decreas-
ing in the patent threshold and corresponding patent patent propensity. That is, ∂Eλ[V (λ,t)]∂mp < 0,
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∂Eλ[V (λ,t)]




Of course, Lemma 2 does not account for the general equilibrium effects of patent policy on the
private incentive to invest in R&D. In particular, the reward to innovation depends on equilibrium
consumption expenditure and the innovation rate, which in turn depend on the allocation of labor
resources between R&D and production captured by the labor market clearing condition. To
incorporate the general equilibrium determination of c and I, I combine the labor market clearing



















1−β (ρ− n+ I)M(λ̃)
. (2.33)
Equation (2.33) represents a single free-entry (FE) condition that captures the relationship between
the private incentive to invest in R&D and the endogenous patent threshold, after incorporating the
general equilibrium effect of the resource allocation trade-off between equilibrium consumption and
innovation. Note that this general equilibrium effect compounds the negative relationship between
I and λ̃. This is because an increase in patent propensity increases the effective resource cost of
c through M(λ̃), leaving fewer resources for R&D. Combined with the negative effect of patent
propensity on the reward to innovation at any constant level of c established by Lemma 2, equation
(2.33) specifies a strictly downward sloping relationship between I and λ̃.
2.4.3 The steady state equilibrium
The model’s equilibrium is determined by solving the patent threshold (PT) condition given by
(2.24) and the free-entry (FE) condition given by (2.33) for the equilibrium values of I and λ̃. As
shown in the Appendix, Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee a unique steady state equilibrium exists
in which I > 0 and 1 < λ̃ < ∞. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium by graphing the PT and FE
conditions in (λ̃, I) space.12
12Note that the economy immediately jumps to the steady state equilibrium at time zero, when the economy
begins with an initial quality draw for each industry. As in Klein (2020), this is because R&D investment, per-capita
consumption expenditure, and each innovator’s patent versus secrecy decision are choice variables.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium
2.5 Growth and Welfare
As is standard, the rate of economic growth is defined as the rate of growth of per capita















In each industry, p(ω, t) equals λ(ω, t) if the leader’s product has not been imitated and one if it
has. Using the law of large numbers, we have
∫ 1
0








As shown in the Appendix, we can express
∫ 1
0 ln(p(ω, t))dω as a stationary price index as a function












The price index is constant in equilibrium, and is strictly decreasing in λ̃ because mp > ms. Note
that if all innovations were kept secret, P (λ̃ = 1) = (1−ms)κ, and if all innovations were patented,
P (λ̃ = ∞) = (1−mp)κ.
Since c and P (λ̃) are constant in equilibrium, the equilibrium rate of growth g ≡ u̇(t)u(t) is equal to
the time derivative of
∫ 1
0 ln(q(ω, t))dω. Within each industry, product quality evolves according to
q(j, ω, t) = λ(ω, t)q(j−1, ω, t) as new vintages are introduced at rate I. As shown in the Appendix,
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ln(λ)f(λ)dλ = Iκ. (2.37)





I + ln(c)− P (λ̃) (2.38)
To better understand the role of patent policy on equilibrium welfare, I consider a social planner
who chooses the levels of c and I to maximize social welfare in (2.38), subject to the resource
constraint (2.30). As in Klein (2020), I assume that the social planner cannot directly control
innovators’ patenting decisions, which implies that each innovator’s patent versus secrecy choice











where Γ is the Lagrange multiplier. Optimization yields the following expression that equates the
social cost and benefit of R&D
α̂I
β























Eλ[V (λ, t)], (2.41)
where Eλ[V (λ, t)] is given by (2.32).
Although (2.40) and (2.41) are too complex to directly compare analytically, they still illuminate
several reasons that the market equilibrium may fail to deliver the socially optimal level of R&D.
First, the social planner scales the entire benefit of R&D by 1 − β, while β does not affect the
market return to R&D. This reflects the negative externality associated with duplicative R&D
investment embedded in the R&D technology of (2.17). As emphasized by Jones and Williams
(2000), this implies that the value of β plays a crucial role in determining if the market equilibrium
exhibits over or under investment in R&D. Second, the social planner internalizes the feedback
effect of the innovation rate on the equilibrium selection into patenting. In other words, unlike
private researchers, the social planner realizes that a consequence of greater R&D is greater patent
propensity since ∂λ̃/∂I > 0.
This feedback effect impacts the social value of R&D through the disclosure function of the
patent system. Since mp > ms, required information disclosure coupled with imperfect backward
patent protection implies that more, usable technical information enters the public domain when a
leader chooses to patent. As a result, a greater proportion of innovations under patent translates
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to a greater proportion of industries that produce under competitive conditions. This increase
in competition effects the social value of R&D through two related channels. (i) The first term
in square brackets represents the effect of increased competition on the labor requirements of
maintaining a constant level of consumption expenditure. That is, as in standard models, the social
planner recognizes that increasing the labor resources devoted to R&D leaves fewer resources for
the production of final goods. However, since ∂M(λ̃)/∂λ̃ > 0, the endogenous increase in selection
into patenting effectively tightens the resource constraint, and increases the scale of this resource
trade-off at the margin. (ii) The second term in brackets captures the welfare benefit of increased
competition through its effect on price index. Since ∂P (λ̃)/∂λ̃ < 0, the shift into patenting implies
a greater utility increase from each innovation. This positive effect of the information disclosure
requirements of the patent system forms the basis for the model’s representation of the contract
theory of patents.
3 Patent Policy
In this section, I analyze the implications of strengthened backward and forward patent protec-
tion in terms of the reward and contract theory of patents. When considering the reward theory,
I evaluate the implications of the policy change for private R&D incentives and the equilibrium
rate of innovation. For the contract theory, I evaluate the policy change’s impact on information
disclosure and competition within industries through the price index.
3.1 Backward Protection
I begin by considering a change to patent disclosure policy that strengthens backward patent
protection (decreases mp). For example, this policy change could represent an explicit reduction
in information disclosure requirements, or increased enforcement against the use of disclosed infor-
mation by imitating followers. The direct effect of strengthened backward patent protection is an
increase in the expected profit flows generated by each patented innovation. The corresponding
increase in the ex ante expected value of an innovation stimulates private R&D investment, and
captures the traditional motivation for strengthened patent protection under the reward theory of
patents.
However, the model’s treatment of endogenous firm selection into patents or secrecy augments
the reward effect in two fundamental ways. First, since only patented innovations enjoy an expected
profit increase, the strength of the reward effect depends on the economy’s endogenous patent
propensity.13 In the extreme case where all firms choose to rely on secrecy (λ̃ → 1), the improved
appropriability offered by patents has no impact on the reward for innovating successfully. In
13Suzuki (2015) and Klein (2020) emphasize a similar result in a framework in which homogenous innovators choose
an appropriation strategy in the form of a patenting, secrecy mix. In these papers, the strength of the reward effect
depends on the weight of patents in this mix. In the present paper, the strength of the reward effect depends on the
economy wide reliance on patents because this is equivalent to the likelihood of receiving an innovation draw that
will be protected by a patent.
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contrast, existing analyses of patent policy where patents are the sole appropriation mechanism by
default implicitly assume that the full reward effect is present. The dependency of the size of the
reward effect from strengthening backward patent protection on endogenous patenting behavior is
depicted in Figure 2 as a nonparallel rightward shift in the FE condition, where the size of the shift
is greater for larger λ̃.
Figure 2: Strengthening backward protection
(a) Equilibrium (b) Price index
Second, strengthening backward patent protection influences equilibrium patent propensity,
which impacts the reward from innovation through each firm’s licensing obligation. Setting aside
the effect of mp on the PT condition, note that the rightward shift to the FE curve results in
movement along the upward sloping PT curve. Intuitively, the increase in the innovation rate im-
plied by the reward effect implies that the forward protection offered by patents is more valuable
at any level of backward protection, enticing more innovators to select into patenting. Moreover,
by directly reducing the probability that a patented innovation will be imitated, strengthening
backward patent protection reduces the effective cost of patenting relative to secrecy. This further
increases the relative attractiveness of choosing to patent over secrecy at at any level of I > 0,
and shifts the PT condition rightward in Figure 2. Since both of these forces imply an increase in
the equilibrium patent threshold, we conclude that strengthening backward patent protection un-
ambiguously increases patent propensity. Due to the model’s treatment of overlapping innovations
across industries, the increase in patent propensity raises each firm’s licensing obligation, which
reduces the expected reward from innovation through the patent thicket effect. This is represented
in Figure 2 as movement along the downward sloping FE curve. The overall change to the equilib-
rium innovation rate is determined by the relative magnitude of the traditional reward effect and
the competing patent thicket effect, and is ambiguous in the general case.
However, even in cases where the reward theory motivation for strengthening backward patent
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protection fails, the policy may still be independently justified through the welfare benefits of
information disclosure as emphasized by the contract theory of patents. This is illustrated in
Panel (b) of Figure 2, which graphs the price index of equation (2.36) along with the equilibrium
value of λ̃⋆ as determined in Panel (a). The movement along the P (λ̃) curve associated with the
equilibrium increase in the patent threshold from stronger backward patent protection captures
the positive welfare effect of increased competition due to information disclosure as more firms
select into patenting. However, since the size of the increase in imitation associated with patenting
is determined by mp − ms > 0, strengthening backward protection decreases this welfare benefit
associated with each patent. This is captured by a rightward shift in in the price index in Panel
(b). Therefore, just as the reward theory, the direction of the change to welfare associated with the
contract theory of patents is determined by the magnitude of two competing effects: the increase in
disclosed information from the endogenous shift into patenting and the decrease in pro-competitive
effect of each individual patent’s disclosure.
Summarizing these findings, we have the following
Proposition 1. Strengthening backward patent protection (decreasing mp) increases the equilib-
rium patent threshold λ̃ and associated patent propensity np, but has an ambiguous effect on the
innovation rate, I, and the price index, P (λ̃).
Before proceeding, note that these findings reflect the inherent tension between the reward and
contract theory of patents. Both the positive welfare impact of increased disclosure and the negative
impact on the innovation rate through the patent thicket effect are driven by the endogenous
shift into patenting. The strength of the patent thicket effect depends on level of forward patent
protection φs, which determines how each firm’s licensing obligation scales with patent propensity
np. However, the value of φs also determines each patent holder’s expected licensing revenue, which
is the key motivation for firm selection into patenting. In this way, the positive disclosure effect of
the patent system will be large only when it is accompanied by a large patent thicket effect. The
pro-innovation reward effect is similarly interrelated and opposed to the positive effect of disclosure
on welfare. The larger the reduction in mp, the larger the size of the reward effect, but the smaller
the disclosure benefit of each patented innovation.14
3.2 Forward Protection
The direct effect of strengthening forward patent protection (increasing φs) is an increase in
patent holder licensing revenue. This implies a greater licensing obligation for each new innovator
at any 0 < np < 1, reducing the expected value of an innovation as established in Lemma 2. This
generates a leftward shift in the FE condition in Figure 3. Once again, the size of the shift is larger
for greater λ̃, since the effective increase in licensing obligation scales with patent propensity. Note
14For comparison with existing analyses that assume innovations are solely protected by patents, I examine a
special case of the model in the the Appendix where patents strictly dominate secrecy for all innovators. In this case,
since policy changes do not impact selection into patenting, the model isolates the welfare trade-off central to the
reward theory of patents, but omits welfare consideration underpinning the contract theory.
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that this creates movement down the PT condition as the relative attractiveness of patents decreases
as a result of the decrease in the innovation rate implied by the shift. However, strengthening
forward protection also generates greater total expected licensing revenue from holding a patent
at any I > 0, and a corresponding increase in the relative attractiveness of choosing to patent
over secrecy. Since the expected number of licensing deals generated from a single patent depends
positively on the the economy’s rate of innovation, the size of this increase to the relative advantage
of patenting increases in I. This is represented in Figure 3 by a nonparallel rightward shift in the
PT condition.
Figure 3: Strengthening forward protection
(a) Equilibrium (b) Price index
Through the patent thicket effect, the shift of the PT condition further reduces the private
incentive to invest in R&D, and the rate on innovation decreases unambiguously. This reflects
the innovation stifling effect of forward patent protection emphasized by existing literature such as
O’donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) and Chu (2009), and implies that strengthening forward patent
protection is never justified through the reward theory of patents. The overall change to the patent
threshold is ambiguous in general, as it depends on the relative magnitude of the downward pressure
implied by the decrease in innovation and the upward pressure from the increase in forward patent
protection. Since the price index does not directly depend on φs, the direction of change to welfare
through the disclosure effect of patenting is solely determined by the change in λ̃. Summarizing,
we have the following proposition,
Proposition 2. Strengthening forward patent protection (increasing φs) decreases the equilibrium
innovation rate, I, but has an ambiguous effect on the patent threshold, λ̃, patent propensity, np,
and the price index, P (λ̃).
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4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, I provide a quantitative assessment of the effects of patent policy on the model’s
equilibrium. My first objective is to better understand the relative magnitudes of the competing
effects described in the previous section. To this end, I calibrate the model to approximate basic
long run features of the U.S. economy, and use this baseline to analyze the effects of policy changes
that strengthen backward and forward protection. Then, I proceed to examine the robustness
of these findings across a range of plausible parameter values. The goal of this exercise is to
characterize the types of situations in which the patent system can be justified on either reward or
contract theory grounds.
4.1 Baseline Calibration
I begin by pre-setting several parameters that are common in endogenous growth models. I
set ρ = 0.07 and n = 0.01 to reflect a 7% long-run real return of the U.S. stock market and 1%
average growth rate of the U.S. labor force. This implies an effective discount rate of ρ− n = 0.06.
I follow Minniti et al. (2013) and Chu et al. (2017) and set the parameter controlling the Pareto
distribution of innovation quality improvements to κ = 0.21. Since each innovator chooses a limit
price equal to the size of its innovation, the value of κ also determines the distribution of innovator
mark-up over cost. The choice of κ = 0.21 implies an average mark-up of about 1.266, which is in
the range of empirical estimates commonly considered in endogenous growth models of 1.05 - 1.4.
As discussed in Impullitti (2010), estimates suggest an empirically relevant range for the degree of
diminishing returns to R&D of 0.4 - 0.9. I set a conservative value of β = 0.4, which is closest to
the case of linear R&D technology within this range.
I choose the model’s remaining parameters of {α, φs,ms,mp} in order to obtain realistic values
of patent propensity, the scope of licensing agreements, and economic growth. As mentioned in
the introduction, empirical estimates of patent propensity range from 30 to 55% (Cohen et al.,
2002; Hall et al., 2014). In the baseline calibration, I target an intermediate value of np = 0.45.
Following Minniti et al. (2013), I target a growth rate of g = κI = 2% to reflect the long-run
growth trend of the U.S. Finally, I rely on estimates provided in Chu (2009) and Yang (2018)
to determine a target for the total expected share of new innovator profits that are transferred
to previous innovators through licensing agreements. In existing models in which all innovators
patent, this “backloading effect” of patents can be set directly. In the present model however,
the corresponding total licensing obligation of a φsnp share of profits depends on the endogenous
economy wide patent propensity. As in Yang (2018), I target a total backloading effect of patents
equal to a 15% share of profits.15 Given our target patent propensity of np = 0.45, this implies a
value of φs = 1/3.
Since firm patenting decisions depend on the relative backward protection provided by secrecy
15As discussed in Chu (2009) and Yang (2018), empirical estimates suggest a range of [0.15, 0.52] for the backloading
effect of patents. Following Yang (2018), I choose a conservative value of 0.15 in the baseline calibration.
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and patenting, ms and mp are not separately identified without an additional restriction. To
account for this, I set ms = 0.49 to reflect survey evidence reported in Cohen et al. (2002) that 51%
of firms consider secrecy to be an effective appropriation mechanism for product innovations. This
leaves two free parameters, backward patent protection mp and the innovation difficulty parameter
α, which I jointly calibrate to match the 2% growth rate and 45% patent propensity targets. This
calibration yields values of α = 1.640 and mp = 0.7909. See Appendix C for a summary of baseline
parameter values.
4.2 Baseline Results
I begin the numerical analysis by examining the impact of strengthening forward patent pro-
tection in the baseline economy. Column 2 of Table 1 displays results following a 25% increase in
φs. In this case, the improved attractiveness of patents relative to secrecy generates an increase in
the economy’s patent propensity of almost 7%. As a result, the licensing burden of new innovators
increases by an equivalent of 6.6% of their flow monopoly profits. In accordance with Proposition
2, this patent thicket effect reduces the private incentive to invest in R&D, and economic growth
decreases as a consequence of stronger forward protection. On the other hand, the fall in R&D does
free up labor resources for the production of final goods, and welfare from equilibrium consumption
expenditure does increase modestly. In addition to this allocative trade-off effect that is standard in
endogenous growth models, the shift into patenting generates a welfare benefit as more information
is disclosed through patents. The associated increase in competition within industries drives the
price index down by 2.8%. However, these positive effects are ultimately dominated by the cost of
reduced economic growth, and total welfare falls as a result of the policy change.
Table 1: Baseline Results
Baseline φs ↑ mp ↓
g(%) 2.000 1.828 1.918
np 0.450 0.519 0.551
φsnp 0.150 0.216 0.184
LR&D(%) 4.532 3.900 4.226
(ρ− n)U 27.22 25.00 26.18
g
(ρ−n) 33.34 30.47 31.97
ln(c) 3.826 4.194 4.010
−P (λ̃) -9.944 -9.657 -9.803
Table 1 displays results from strengthening forward patent protection by increasing φs 25% and strengthen-
ing backward patent protection to generate a 25% decrease in (mp−ms). The final six rows report the total
backloading effect of patents (φsnp), the share of labor employed in R&D, and total welfare as specified in
(2.38) followed by total welfare’s three component parts. All welfare measures have been multiplied by 100
for display purposes.
Next, I examine the effects of strengthening backward patent protection. In particular, I con-
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sider a decrease in mp that generates a 25% decrease in the effective cost of patenting, mp −ms.
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Recall from Proposition 1 that strengthening backward protection creates opposing effects on the
private incentives to invest in R&D. On the one hand, the improved appropriability provided by
patents increases the ex ante expected value of an innovation and encourages R&D, as emphasized
by the reward theory. On the other hand, the corresponding shift into patenting increases each
firm’s licensing burden, which discourages R&D. In this case, the results in Table 1 show that the
policy change induces a large increase in patent propensity of about 10%. Although there is no
change to the size of each individual licensing deal, each firm’s licensing burden still increases 3.4%.
Overall, the reward effect only partially offsets this patent thicket effect, and economic growth falls
as a result of the policy change.
Moreover, the policy change generates competing effects on the welfare benefit of the disclosure
of information through patents. Specifically, the realized benefit of disclosure is the lower price
of goods implied by the greater rate of imitation for innovations under patent relative to those
that remain secret. Since this relative increase in imitation is determined by mp −ms, the policy
change directly decreases the welfare benefit of each patented innovation. On the other hand,
the associated shift into patenting implies that fewer innovations are kept secret. In this case, the
increase in patent propensity is sufficiently large so that the price index falls. However, this positive
welfare effect of the policy change is not enough to justify the policy change on contract theory
grounds. Once again, the welfare cost of reduced economic growth dominates, and social welfare
decreases when backward protection is strengthened from its baseline level.
4.3 Backward Patent Protection and the Reward Theory
I now turn to a closer examination of the relationship between backward patent protection
and economic growth. I begin by considering results across a wider range for backward patent
protection, holding all other parameters to their baseline value. The results of this experiment are
displayed in Figure 4, which plots economic growth, patent propensity and welfare against backward
patent protection (1−mp). In each case, I vary 1−mp from zero, representing nonexistent backward
protection, to its upper bound implied by Assumption 2 so that patent propensity remains below
one. With the baseline values of ms, φs, and κ, this upper bound is about 0.45.
First, note that even when patents do not provide any backward protection (1 − mp = 0), a
sizable proportion of about 30% of innovators still select into patenting. This is because some
innovators, necessarily those with sufficiently low monopoly profits associated with small innova-
tions, are willing to sacrifice their entire profit stream in exchange for the expected licensing revenue
offered by forward patent protection. Second, note that economic growth is non-monotonic in back-
ward patent protection. This reflects the changing relative magnitude of the competing reward and
patent thicket effects as patent propensity increases along with backward patent protection. That
is, the greater the proportion of innovations that are protected by patents, the greater the impact
16Given the baseline values of mp = 0.7909 and ms = 0.4900, this policy change corresponds to a 9.51% decrease
in mp to 0.7157.
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Figure 4: Baseline: Backward Patent Protection and Growth
(a) Growth (b) Patent Propensity (c) Welfare
of strengthening backward protection has on the ex ante expected value of an innovation. However,
in the baseline case, we see that patent propensity must be close to one (about 0.96) before the
reward effect begins to dominate the patent thicket effect from further strengthening protection.
Clearly, the economy achieves its highest growth rate, and social welfare, when backward protection
is set to zero.
Next, I turn to examining the relationship between backward patent protection and economic
growth under alternate parameters. First, I consider weaker forward protection, which implies a
smaller patent thicket effect for any corresponding increase in patent propensity. I set φs = 0.111
so that that each innovator’s expected licensing obligation, φsnp, is 5% of monopoly profits when
patent propensity is 45%, instead of the 15% of profits assumed in the baseline equilibrium. Second,
I consider a distribution of innovation quality increments with a smaller right tail by setting κ =
0.0475. This implies that the average mark-up in the economy is 1.05, instead of the 1.266 assumed
in the baseline. In both cases, I recalibrate the value of α so that the growth rate remains 2% at
the starting point of 45% patent propensity. See Appendix C for associated parameter values.
Interestingly, Figure 5 illustrates that weaker forward protection does little to alter the rela-
tionship between backward patent protection and economic growth. Although a lower φs implies
a smaller patent thicket effect at each level of patent propensity, it also implies that the option to
patent is less attractive at each level of backward protection. Since fewer firms patent, strengthen-
ing backward protection generates a smaller increase in the ex ante expected value of an innovation.
In other words, since firms select into patents specifically to gain expected licensing revenue, the
size of the reward effect is directly linked to the size of the patent thicket effect. As a result, the
reduction in forward protection decreases the magnitude of both effects. This implies a smaller
absolute impact of backward protection on economic growth, but growth continues to decrease in
backward protection until patent propensity approaches one.
In contrast, Figure 6 shows that the distribution of innovation size has a substantial impact
of the relative importance of the patent thicket and reward effects. A smaller right tail of the
distribution reduces the weight of very large innovation outliers on the ex ante expected value of an
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Figure 5: Low φs: Backward Patent Protection and Growth
(a) Growth (b) Patent Propensity (c) Welfare
innovation. Since these outliers are always protected by secrecy, reducing their prevalence increases
the importance of patent protection on the expected value of an innovation, and leads to a larger
reward effect. In this case, the reward effect begins to dominate the patent thicket effect when
patent propensity reaches about 88.5%. Moreover, we see that backward patent protection can
have an overall positive impact on growth and welfare. Compared to the case of zero protection,
strengthening backward protection to the point where patent propensity approaches one increases
economic growth, and social welfare.
Figure 6: Low κ: Backward Patent Protection and Growth
(a) Growth (b) Patent Propensity (c) Welfare
4.4 Forward Patent Protection and the Contract Theory
In the cases examined so far, the welfare effect of patent policy has largely been determined by
the policy’s impact on economic growth. Any change to welfare through the information disclosure
function of the patent system as emphasized by the contract theory has been secondary to reward
theory considerations. In this section, I explore whether plausible cases exist in which strengthening
patent protection can be justified through the contract theory. In particular, I repeat the policy
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experiment of strengthening forward protection through a 25% increase in φs across different levels
of decreasing returns to R&D with β ranging from 0.4− 0.9. As before, I recalibrate α in each case
so that the growth rate remains 2% in the pre-policy change equilibrium with patent propensity at
45%. The calibrated values of α can be found in Appendix C.
In Table 2, I report all results in terms of the change from the corresponding initial equilibrium to
the new equilibrium after forward protection has been strengthened. In accordance with Proposition
2, strengthening forward protection is always growth reducing in the model. However, the larger
the value of β, corresponding to a greater degree of diminishing returns to R&D, the smaller
the associated decrease in growth. Indeed, this result holds despite a greater increase in patent
propensity and the backloading effect of patents as β increases. This is because the reduction in
the labor employed in R&D implies a larger increase in R&D productivity when the duplication of
R&D efforts within industries is more severe.
In terms of welfare, this implies that the negative impact of growth reduction shrinks, while the
positive disclosure effect grows as β increases. At the highest degree of diminishing returns to R&D
with β = 0.9, strengthening forward patent protection becomes welfare improving. Importantly,
note that the increase in consumption expenditure alone is not sufficient to overcome the welfare
cost of reduced growth. Thus, the positive disclosure effect of the patent system does play a crucial
role in the welfare effect of the policy change. On the other hand, although this result demonstrates
that the contract theory can justify stronger forward protection, it seems that it is best interpreted
as an illustrative special case. Across the clear majority of plausible cases, the overall welfare effects
of patent policy are drive by the policy’s impact on economic growth.
Table 2: Strengthening Forward Patent Protection
β = 0.4 β = 0.5 β = 0.6 β = 0.7 β = 0.8 β = 0.9
∆g(%) -0.172 -0.139 -0.107 -0.078 -0.051 -0.025
∆np(%) 6.854 7.135 7.391 7.626 7.841 8.040
∆φsnp(%) 6.607 6.724 6.831 6.928 7.079 7.101
∆LR&D(%) -0.632 -0.607 -0.584 -0.563 -0.544 -0.526
∆(ρ− n)U -2.218 -1.684 -1.185 -0.717 -0.278 0.136
∆ g(ρ−n) -2.874 -2.313 -1.791 -1.301 -0.841 -0.408
∆ln(c) 0.369 0.330 0.294 0.261 0.230 0.202
−∆P (λ̃) 0.287 0.300 0.312 0.323 0.333 0.343
Table 2 displays results from strengthening forward patent protection by increasing φs 25% across
different values of β. Results in the first column, with β = 0.4, correspond to the baseline case as
reported in Table 1. All results are reported in terms of the change from the initial equilibrium to
the new equilibrium after forward protection has been strengthened.
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5 Conclusion
The objectives of the patent system are characterized by two distinct theories of its social value.
According to the reward theory, patents stimulate innovation by enhancing the ex ante incentive to
invest in R&D. According to the contract theory, patents encourage successful innovators to disclose
technical information that would otherwise remain secret. Despite the clear interdependence of
these twin purposes of the patent system, the extant literature has thus far either analyzed them
separately, or restricted attention to partial equilibrium settings.
In this paper, I contribute to the literature by developing a novel general equilibrium model
of endogenous growth that incorporates both potential justifications of the patent system. The
model features profit maximizing innovators that select into either patents or secrecy based on
their innovation’s size, the effective cost of information disclosure, and the expected licensing rev-
enue from holding a patent. Firms with relatively large innovations select into secrecy to avoid
disclosure requirements and maintain their large competitive advantage over competitors. Firms
with relatively small innovations choose to patent because the effective cost of disclosure is low
relative to expected licensing revenue extracted from subsequent innovators. The combination of
forward patent protection in the form of mandatory licensing agreements and voluntary selection
into patenting gives rise to the endogenous determination of each new innovator’s licensing burden,
capturing the presence of patent thickets.
In this context, the model illustrates that endogenous innovator selection into patents and
secrecy is central to understanding the tension between the patent system’s objectives of stimulat-
ing innovation and disseminating technical information. On the one hand, strengthening backward
patent protection implies a classic reward theory trade-off; improved appropriability enhances R&D
incentives at the expense of limiting competition. On the other hand, the increased relative attrac-
tiveness of patenting generates an increase in patent propensity. This shift into patenting expands
the proportion of innovations for which technical information is disclosed, while increasing the
licensing burden of innovator’s through the patent thicket effect. I show that these effects stem-
ming from changes to innovator selection into patenting can be sufficiently strong such that the
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Appendix A
A.1 Calculation of Eλ[π(λ, t)]


















































A.2 Calculation of Eλ[V (λ, t)]
From equation (2.31),






































































Combining (A.6) and (A.8), yields (2.32) in the main text.
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A.3 Production labor

























































Solving the integration gives
ny(t) = c(t)N(t)
[











A.4 Calculation for welfare and growth














Plugging this result into equations (2.35) and (2.37) in the main text give the stated results.
A.5 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the patent threshold (PT) condition given by (2.24) and the free-
entry (FE) condition given by (2.33) provide two equations in two unknown equilibrium values of
I and λ̃. I demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the model’s steady state equilibrium by
establishing the existence of a single crossing of the PT and FE conditions in (λ̃, I) space, with
1 < λ̃ < ∞ and 0 < I < ∞.
As argued in Section 2.4.1, the PT condition is strictly upward sloping in (λ̃, I) space, with
I → 0 as λ̃ → 1 and I → ∞ as λ̃ → λ̃max, where 1 < λ̃max < ∞ as given by (2.26). From Section
2.4.2, the FE condition is strictly downward sloping in in (λ̃, I) space. Therefore, single crossing
obtains if the innovation rate implied by the FE condition at λ̃ = 1 is positive (the vertical intercept
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of the FE condition in Figure 1). Plugging λ̃ = 1 into equation (2.33) implicitly defines this I,
α̂I
β
1−β (ρ− n+ I)(1 + κms) = (1− α̂I
1
1−β )(κ(1−ms)), (A.15)
which has a unique solution with 0 < I < ∞.
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Appendix B
B.1 Patent dominant equilibrium
In the paper’s main analysis, Assumption 2 ensures that the effective cost of the disclosure
requirements of patenting are sufficiently high such that some firms always prefer secrecy in equi-
librium (0 < np < 1). In this section, I briefly examine the model’s equilibrium when patents
strictly dominate secrecy for each possible innovation size λ > 1 and np = 1. Specifically, in place
of Assumption 2, let us instead assume that mp < ms and φs > 0.
In this case, patenting offers superior protection from imitation than secrecy in addition to
forward protection, so it is clear that patenting is optimal for each innovator. Note that these
parameters imply that the inequality in (2.21) is always strict, with Vs(λ, t) < Vp(λ, t) for all
λ < 1, so the PT equilibrium condition of equation (2.24) no longer applies, λ̃ = ∞, and np =
1. To illustrate the similarity between traditional treatments and the model’s patent dominant
equilibrium, we can characterize the equilibrium through two conditions in two unknowns c and I.
That is, given λ̃ = ∞ and np = 1, we can write the labor market clearing condition (2.30) and the





















Observe that (B.1) specifies the traditional downward sloping resource constraint in (c, I) space
and (B.2) specifies the traditional upward sloping free-entry condition. Finally, note from (2.36)
that the price index is now completely given by parameter values with P (λ̃ = ∞) = (1−mp)κ.
Given Assumption 1, it is straightforward to verify that a unique equilibrium exists. Figure
B1 illustrates the equilibrium determination of I by graphing (B.1) and (B.2) in (c, I) space.17
Repeating the shift analysis of Section 3 immediately gives the following
Proposition B1. When patents strictly dominate secrecy (np = 1),
- Strengthening backward patent protection increases the equilibrium innovation rate and in-
creases the price index.
- Strengthening forward patent protection decreases the equilibrium innovation rate and has no
effect on the price index.
Thus, strengthening backward patent protection unambiguously increases the economy’s innovation
rate when all innovations are protected by patent. This is because the full reward effect from the
policy change is present, while there is no increase to the patent thicket effect since there is no
change to innovators’ selection into patents versus secrecy. On the other hand, the price index
17Since the FE condition of (2.33) incorporates both the free-entry condition and the labor market clearing con-
straint, one can also visualize the equilibrium determination of I in the patent dominant equilibrium as the asymptote
of the FE condition as λ̃ → ∞ in Figure 1.
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increases unambiguously since fewer innovations are imitated and there is no offsetting increase to
the amount of information disclosure. In this way, the patent dominant equilibrium isolates the
welfare trade-off central to traditional treatments of the reward theory of patents, but omits welfare
considerations underpinning the contact theory.




Table C3: Baseline Calibration Summary
Pre-set Description Value
ρ Discount factor/ interest rate 0.07
n Population growth 0.01
κ Innovation dist. param. 0.21
β Dim. returns to R&D 0.4
ms Secrecy imitation prob. 0.49
Calibrated Description Value
φs Forward protection 0.333
α Innovation difficulty 1.640
mp Patent imitation prob. 0.7909
Table C4: Recalibrated α for robustness checks
φs = 0.111 κ = 0.475 β = 0.5 β = 0.6 β = 0.7 β = 0.8 β = 0.9
α = 1.7935 0.2074 2.235 3.045 4.150 5.655 7.705
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